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Epidemiologic Proof of Probability:
Implementing the Proportional Recovery
Approach in Toxic Exposure Torts
I. Introduction
American industry generated more than a ton of hazardous
chemical wastes in 1981 for each living person in the United States.'
The estimated total of toxic substance generation - 264 million
metric tons - does not indicate the full extent of the problem, since
not all hazardous wastes are subject to federal reporting require-
ments.2 Indeed, while more dangerous chemicals are developed each
year, millions of tons of previously created substances must still be
stored, treated, or disposed of.' In 1981, fully sixty percent of all
wastes were disposed underground' - often above water tables
while other wastes were stored in open pits and lagoons.'
Toxic substances can cause serious personal injury.6 Therefore,
as toxic chemical generation accelerates, concern grows about the
public health effects of increased exposure to those chemicals, both
in the form of waste material and in substances in everyday use."
From a legal perspective, conduct concerning toxic substances may
be subject to statutory regulation or penalty.' When personal injuries
1. EPA Raises Figures on Hazardous Waste Generated by Industry, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 30, 1984, at 22, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as EPA Raises Figures].
2. Id.
3. Hazardous Waste Exceeds Estimates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, Al, col. 3, at
A18, col. 5 [hereinafter cited as Hazardous Waste].
4. EPA Raises Figures, supra note 1, at 22, col. 4.
5. Hazardous Waste, supra note 3 at Al, col. 5.
6. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1973) (birth defects); Stahlberger v. American Cyanimid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970)
(polio); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1979: Joint Hearing on S. 1865 Before the
Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 33-50 (1982) (state-
ments of Rell Frederick, Lois Blood, and Harris Charley, concerning radiation exposure from
uranium mining and the Nevada nuclear tests). See generally Rheingold and Jacobson, The
Toxic Tort Cause of Action, in Toxic TORTS 1, 2-4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Rheingold
and Jacobson].
7. See, e.g., Toxic Waste Laws: U.S. May Be Biggest Violator, Wash. Post, Aug. 17,
1983, at Al, col. 1; Emergency Rule on Exposure to Asbestos Is Under Serious Consideration
by OSHA, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1983, at 2, col. 3; U.S. Won't Ask High Court To Reinstate
Ban On Use of Formaldehyde Insulation, Wall St. J., Aug. 26, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
8. See infra notes 18-19.
result from that conduct, however, the victim probably will seek re-
dress through tort law.9 Increased exposure to man-made chemi-
cals 0 or radiation1" has created what might be termed a new species
of "toxic torts."
There is often no precise knowledge about how a particular
toxin causes injury;12 no known biological mechanism 3 exists by
which to trace the toxin inevitably to the injury. In such cases, the
only evidence of causation may be the statistical association between
exposure to the toxin and an increased incidence of injury in the
total population so exposed.1 ' While this evidence may also suggest
causation in the individual case, statistical probability does not rise
to the traditional "more-likely-than-not"' 15 standard of proof. There-
9. See Rheingold and Jacobson, supra note 6, at 5-17.
10. Legal actions have resulted from exposure to a wide variety of chemicals. See, e.g.,
In re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1128 (1981) (herbicides containing 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin); Drayton
v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978) (sulfuric acid in drain cleaner); Heritage
v. Pioneer Brokerage and Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1979) (formaldehyde); Sindell v.
Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980) (DES, diethylstilbesterol); Little v. PPG Industries, Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594
P.2d 911 (1979) (tricholoroethane in solvent).
The term "toxic substances" has also been defined to include "commercial biological prep-
arations." Soble, Statute: A Proposal For the Administrative Compensation of Victims of
Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 683, 689 n.4 (1977) (quot-
ing E.P.A. General Provisions and Inventory Reporting Requirements, 40 C.F.R. §§700, 710)
[hereinafter cited as Toxic Substance Pollution]. Thus, toxic torts should include cases of
injury from organic substances. See, Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (polio vaccine); Larigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963) (cigarettes); Zeck v.
United States, 559 F. Supp. 1345 (D. S.D. 1983) (swine flu vaccine).
Concepts of causation discussed in this comment apply equally to contexts other than
toxic torts. Cf. Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919) (exposure to
typhoid through city water supply); McCuiston v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 303 N.C.
795, 303 S.E.2d 795 (1983) (loss of hearing caused by low levels of noise).
11. For purposes of this comment, radiation injuries will be viewed as toxic torts. Levy,
Radiation Litigation - The Emerging Tort Field, 25 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE, 568, 568 (1982).
See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), modified, 667
F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Microwaves Linked to Glandular Changes and Cancer,
Phila. Inquirer, Aug. 17, 1984, at A2, col. 1 (mircrowaves radiation linked to effects on adre-
nal glands and endocrine system).
12. Many toxic tort injuries are cancers. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See generally
Tort Actions For Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation and Environmental Carcinogenesis, 90
YALE L.J. 840 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Tort Actions for Cancer]. Of course, toxic tort
injuries are not limited.
13. The biological mechanism by which a disease occurs is known as its etiology. More
accurately, the mechanism comprises only part of etiology:
The etiology of a disease may be thought of as having a sequence consisting
of two parts: (1) causal events occurring prior to same initial bodily response and
(2) mechanisms within the body leading from the initial response to the charac-
teristic manifestation of the disease.
B. MACMAHON & T. PUGH, EPIDEMIOLOGY 26 (1970) [hereinafter cited as MACMAHON &
PUGH].
14. See infra notes 25-27, 32-37 and accompanying text.
15. "More-likely-than-not" is the standard burden of persuasion in most civil litigation.
Also known as the "preponderance of evidence" standard, it roughly corresponds to a 51% or
greater certainty on the part of the trier of fact that a proposition is true. See Kaye, The
fore, while it may be likely that a defendant in a toxic tort case
caused an increased occurrence of injuries among a group of per-
sons, the individual plaintiff may be unable to establish the element
of causation necessary to recover.
While courts have been reluctant to adopt modifications of
traditional concepts of causation,16 legislation similar to the proposal
presented in this comment has been introduced in the United States
Senate.17 Certain harmful conduct may already be subject to statu-
tory penalties18 or injunctive relief. 9 However, the proposed reme-
dies are public; they do not compensate victims once injuries have
occurred, nor do they necessarily provide adequate incentive to pre-
vent personal injuries.
This comment proposes that individual plaintiffs in toxic tort
cases be permitted to recover upon proving a probability20 of causa-
tion not necessarily meeting the traditional "more-likely-than-not"
requirement. Minimizing errors in deciding cases, the policy behind
the traditional burden of proof, simply fails in the toxic tort context.
Adherence to the rule actually creates the most egregious error of
all. It completely precludes recovery by persons who have been in-
jured by the defendant. To prevent the equally undesirable error of
overcharging defendants for injuries they did not cause, this com-
ment also proposes that plaintiffs be required to accept less than
their total damages, with each plaintiff's recovery proportioned upon
the probability proved.
II. The Problem of Causation
Essentially, the problem of proving causation in toxic tort cases
stems from differences between medical and legal determinations of
cause. 21 Since the solution to the problem depends on comprehending
Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 101, 102-03 [hereinafter
cited as Gatecrasher].
16. See, e.g., Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d 502, 509 n.3 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding
arguments for modification of causation requirements in cases of "probabilistic evidence" per-
suasive, but declining to modify them "in this case").
17. S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. §3924 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983).
18. E.g., Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §333 (1976) (providing for fines
and prison terms).
19. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §2606(2)(b)(1) (1982) (authorizing federal district courts to grant
"temporary or permanent relief as may be necessary to protect health or environment" from
imminent hazard due to toxic substances).
20. Some courts distinguish a "probability" that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff's
injury from a mere "possibility," the former meeting the more likely than not standard while
the latter does not. See, e.g., Employer's Mut. Liab. Co. v. Parker, 418 S.W.2d 570, 573-74
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967). For purposes of this comment, "probability" will refer to all statistical
associations of cause with effect, even those below 51%. This usage is consistent with that of
other courts. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975), modi-
fied, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976).
21. See Toxic Substance Pollution, supra note 10, at 737-42; O'Toole, Radiation,
Causation, and Compensation, 54 GEO. L.J. 751, 767-76 (1966).
medical methods within the legal process of determination," this
section first analyzes the medical methods and then reviews current
legal rules for finding cause-in-fact.
A. Medical Causation and Epidemiology
The precise etiology28 for many diseases occurring after expo-
sure to toxic substances is not understood. For now, science knows of
no cellular or subcellular mechanism by which exposure to the sub-
stance leads step-by-step to the disease. For example, exposure to
certain dosages of benzene is known to cause myeletic leukemia,2
yet the biochemical mechanism by which the disease results is un-
known.15 When etiology of a disease is unknown, medical determina-
tion of the cause must rest on other evidence. Most often,2  this
"other evidence" is limited to statistical correlation between expo-
sure to the suspected causal agent (the toxic substance) and an in-
crease in the number of persons so exposed who develop the
disease. 7
Medical research prefers to establish this correlation by care-
fully controlled experimentation.28 Animal experiments, however,
may be impossible2 9 or of limited application to human experience.30
When the disease investigated is potentially fatal, such as cancer, or
paralyzing, such as Guillain-Barre Syndrome, human experimenta-
tion is impractical and unethical.3 ' Because of ethical and practical
22. See infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 13.
24. Note, Establishing Causation in Chemical Exposure Cases: The Precursor Symp-
toms Theory, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 163, 164 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Precursor Symptoms
Theory].
25. Id. at 173. Further examples of unknown etiology abound. See, e.g., Levy, supra
note 11, at 570-71 ("radiation can cause a wide range of injuries .... Exactly how the living
tissues are affected or destroyed is not clear"); Alvarez v. United States, 495 F. Supp. 1188
(D. Colo. 1980) (government stipulated that swine flu vaccine can cause Guillain-Barre Syn-
drome although government expert testified that the cause of GBS is unknown).
26. In some cases, even statistical evidence of causation is unavailable. For example, no
toxin-free population may be found to act as a control group. See Environmental Defense
Fund v. E.P.A., 510 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("virtually universal contamination of
humans by residues of aldrin/dieldrin"); Note, Precursor Symptoms Theory, supra note 24, at
173 (benzene "present virtually everywhere in the atmosphere").
27. See, e.g., Tort Actions for Cancer, supra note 12, at 848 (carcinogenesis described
only in terms of correlations between incidence and exposure). See generally MACMAHON &
PUGH, supra note 13, at 17-27.
28. Experimentation is "the deliberate application or withholding of the supposed cause
and observation for the subsequent appearance or lack of appearance of the effect." MACMA-
HON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 40.
29. See, e.g., Note, Precursor Symptoms Theory, supra note 24, at 173 (no reported
experiments have succeeded in inducing leukemia in benzene-exposed rodents).
30. See, e.g., Rossi, The Estimation of Low-Dose Hazards by Extrapolation from
High Doses, 54 YALE J. BIO. & MED. 339, 339 (impossible to use observations on animals as a
basis of absolute risk estimates for humans because radiation sensitivity varies amongst species
and even strains of the same animal).
31. See generally PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, COMPENSATING FOR RESEARCH IN-
obstacles to experimentation, medical science instead employs empir-
ical studies of "natural circumstances that mimic an experiment." '
Investigators obtain data about persons naturally exposed 3 to a sus-
pected causal agent and use the data to calculate the required corre-
lation. This process of obtaining a correlation to determine the cause
of disease is known as epidemiology. More specifically, epidemiology
is "the study of the distribution of disease and the search for the
determinants of the observed distribution.1
3 4
In epidemiology, a causal association is an association between
categories of events in which an alteration of one event precedes a
change in the other.3 5 Thus, a cause is a factor that, if removed,
decreases the chance of the disease. 6 The first step in determining
causal association is to determine a "statistical association" between
the suspected cause and the disease. Ultimately, the epidemiologist
derives the statistical association by comparing groups of persons
and determining whether the difference between the groups (tenta-
tively attributed to the "cause") is statistically significant.37
JURIES (1982); D. GALLANT & R. FORCE, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN RESEARCH
AND TREATMENT (1978); N. HERSHEY & R. MILLER, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION AND THE
LAW (1976); J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS (1972); Feinstein & Horwitz,
Double Standards, Scientific Methods. and Epidemiologic Research, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1611, 1611 (1982).
32. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 40; Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 31,
at 1611-13.
33. Natural exposures to toxic substances for epidemiological purposes include any ex-
posures not induced by the researcher. Thus, natural exposure may be self-imposed, as when
persons take the substance as a drug (e.g., DES), may occur by occupational exposure (e.g.,
uranium miners exposed to radiation) or may occur by accident (e.g., victims of toxic spills).
34. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 1 (emphasis in original). See generally
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, REPORT FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON
SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES, at 11-15 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENTS].
35. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 17-18.
36. Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics, 17 FORUM 729, 802 (1982). Epidemio-
logic cause appears to be somewhat broader than the legal notion of cause-in-fact, which usu-
ally requires that the injury not occur at all "but for" the causal factor. However, a plaintiff
"need not negative entirely the possibility that the defendant's conduct was not a cause."
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 242 (4th ed. 1971). Dean Prosser notes further:
The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man can say
with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted
otherwise. Proof of what we call the relation of cause and effect, that of neces-
sary antecedent and inevitable consequence, can be nothing more than "the pro-
jection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain anteced-
ents merely because we had observed these sequences on previous occasions."
Id.
Indeed, the epidemiologic concept of cause corresponds closely to the "substantial factor"
test, an alternative to the legal "but for" test of causation except that epidemiologic "cause" is
determined for the generality of cases, not the particular case. Under the "substantial factor"
test, defendant's conduct is a cause if it is a "material element and a substantial factor" in
bringing about the effect. Id. at 240. In epidemiology, the causal association is required to be
statistically significant. See infra note 37.
37. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 18-19. Determination of whether a differ-
ence between study groups is statistically significant requires determination that the difference
is not due to randomness or chance. Statistical significance can be determined by a process
For example, suppose that a toxic spill exposes a group of 100
persons to a certain chemical. The epidemiologist would assemble
another group of 100 persons with similar characteristics who were
not exposed to the chemical. He would then observe these two groups
"forward in time"38 to determine the number of persons in each
group who develop the disease at various periods of time after expo-
sure.39 Assume that ten years after the spill 15 persons among the
exposed group have developed liver cancer, while only 10 persons
among those unexposed develop liver cancer after the same amount
of time. The risk of contracting liver cancer after ten years for the
unexposed group is 10/100 or. 10. This risk indicates that the chemi-
cal, while a suspected cause of liver cancer, cannot be the only cause
since the cancer occurs in the chemical's absence.4 The exposed
group has a risk of 15/100 or .15. Therefore, there is an increase in
risk for the group exposed over the group not exposed of 5/100, or
.05.
known as hypothesis testing, which is itself a calculation of probabilities. See J. FREUND,
MODERN ELEMENTARY STATISTICS, 239-52 (2d ed. 1960). See generally D. BARNES, STATIS-
Tics As PROOF 143-62 (1983); Note, Statistics and the Law, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313,
325-28 (1983); Wong, A Practical Guide For Non-Epidemiologists, Part II, Occ. HEALTH &
SAFETY, Nov. 1981, at 24-25.
38. The forward-moving epidemiological study also known as a cohort study, follows
differently exposed groups forward in time to observe changes in each group as compared to
the others. In contrast, a case-control study begins with persons who already have the disease
or effect under study. The researcher selects a control group of persons with similar character-
istics, and the two are traced backwards to determine each subject's prior exposure to the
suspected causal agent. Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 31, at 1612. See generally MACMA-
HON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 39-46, 207-82.
Epidemiologists prefer cohort studies over case-controls, because case-controls yield only
the "odds of exposure" to the causal agent for each group. Cohort studies are closer to experi-
mental studies. They yield a direct comparison of the risks of occurrence of the disease or
effect among the study groups. However, when cohort studies are impractical epidemiologists
will use case-controls. Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 31, at 1612.
39. The number of cases occurring after a specified time period is known as the inci-
dence of the disease, expressed as a ratio per unit of population. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra
note 13, at 60-62.
40. Cf. Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 31, at 1612 ("a small but distinct risk in the
unexposed group would indicate that tea drinking could not be the only cause of renal
stones").
41. See id. The increased risk for the exposed group above the risk for the unexposed
group is the "attributable risk." Expressing the difference in risk between the two groups as a
quotient yields a "relative risk." This "relative risk" is a better measure by which to draw an
inference that the suspected cause did in fact cause an increase in disease or injury among the
group. MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 238-39. Whichever way expressed, the in-
creased risk, though not determinative of causation in any individual case, does represent the
"loss of a chance" to avoid the injury on the part of each member of the exposed group. While
each person without exposure in the above hypothetical has a 10/100 chance of getting the
disease, or a 90/100 chance of avoiding it, each exposed person has a 15/100 chance, or only
an 85/100 chance of avoiding cancer, - a loss of chance of 5/100. This loss of a chance may
itself be compensable if the loss is of a "better than even" (50% or greater) chance of avoid-
ance. See King, Causation, Valuation and Chance In Personal Injury Torts Involving Preex-
isting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1363-70 (1980). It has even
been suggested that losses of less than a 50% chance of avoidance should be compensated. Id.
at 1376-87. Compensation for loss of a chance is not the same as compensating an individual
for the probability that a toxic agent caused his particular injury. Id. at 1395. The lost chance
This figure represents those five additional persons who con-
tracted cancer in the exposed group, or the excess incidence of the
disease. It is this excess which must be determined to be statistically
significant" before an epidemiologist will acknowledge that a statis-
tical association exists between exposure to the toxic substance and
the increase of liver cancer. A statistical association, however, does
not itself establish that the chemical causes excess liver cancers be-
cause not all statistical associations are causal.'3 In the absence of
experimental data, the epidemiologist must consider other criteria
before drawing an inference of causation."'
Epidemiologists use at least three criteria'5  to determine
whether a given statistical association is causal. First, they consider
the strength of association.' Obviously, the stronger the association,
the more likely the factor is causal. Second, they look for a credible
time sequence; that is, that the suspected cause preceded the effect.
Finally, they analyze the biological credibility of the suspected cau-
sation. For example, a hypothesis for causation that incorporates a
known biological mechanism makes an inference of causation more
reasonable. At the same time, step-by-step elimination of noncausal
explanations for the result also supports the inference of causation.
Statistical associations apply only to groups not to individual in-
stances within a group. In the above hypothetical, even if a causal
inference can be drawn from the association between the chemical
equals the attributable risk, while the probability of causation equals the relative risk. The lost
chance is the individual's injury and defendant can be linked causally to it, while the
probability of causation is proof of the causal link between defendant and a physical injury. If
probability of causation is viewed as an injury to the person, however, it becomes analogous to
the lost chance situation. See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 37.
43. As some commentators have explained: "if category A is causally associated with
both category B and C ... , B and C will also be associated statistically. However, the associa-
tion . . . is non-causal, since there is no prospect of altering C by manipulating B .... "
MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 20. Therefore, when a statistical association exists,
noncausal explanations must be researched for and ruled out before an inference of causation
can be drawn. Id. at 21.
44. See generally B. MACMAHON & T. PUGH, supra note 13 at 20-22; Ryan, The
Epidemiological Method of Building Causal Inference, 5 ADVANCES IN NURSING SCIENCE 73
(1982); Evans, Causation and Disease: The Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALE J. Bio.
& MED. 175 (1976).
45. See MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 20-21. These are minimal criteria.
See also Evans, supra note 44, which advocates consideration of ten criteria before drawing a
causal inference.
46. Strength of association "does not mean the degree of statistical significance but the
degree to which the situation of a disease being entirely absent in one circumstance and invari-
ably present in another is approached." MACMAHON & PUGH, supra note 13, at 35. For
example, if the disease naturally occurs at a rate of one per 100 and after exposure occurs at a
rate of 99 per 100, the strength of association is extremely high. The comparison of the two
rates in the form of a quotient yields the relative risk. Strength of association explains why
relative risk is the best indicator of causation. See supra note 41.
In some cases, strength of association may be strong enough itself to allow the inference
of causation to be drawn. For instance, if a disease never occurs unless there has been exposure
to the toxic substance, the toxin is considered the cause. See Levy, supra note 11, at 571.
and increased number of liver cancers, the association does not show
that the chemical caused any particular case of cancer even within
the five additional cases. Given only the statistical association, the
best alternative is to calculate the probability of causation.' The
probability that any one of the fifteen cancers in the exposed group
was caused by the exposure is five out of fifteen, or .33.
Several additional factors complicate the problem of epidemio-
logical determination of causation when only a probability of causa-
tion can be established in the particular instance.48 But these matters
are not crucial to an understanding of the relationship between med-
ical and legal cause.
47. E.g., Oftedal, Knut & Torlief, On The Probability of Radiation Being the Cause
of Leukaemia, 41 BRIT. J. RADIOL. 711-12 (1968) (letter to editor):
In the a posteriori analysis of the causes of an observed event, the statistical
theorem known as "Baye's Law" is applicable. Expressed in simplified non-tech-
nical terms, this law contends that the probability of any cause X being the real
cause in the observed event, is equal to the a priori probability px of this cause
X leading to the event, relative to the sum of all a priori probabilities for the
event to occur or
px
post. prob. X - +px + py
where py is the probability of the observed event being due to all causes except
X.
Id. at 711. See also 129 CONG. REC. §3922 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) ("Questions and An-
swers" entered in the record at the request of Sen. Hatch) (explaining "probability of causa-
tion" and its application in a proposed "Radiogenic Cancer Compensation Act").
48. The technique of dose extrapolation may have to be employed in certain cases to
determine effects of a toxic substance at the particular dosage of interest. See REVIEW OF
RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 34, at 35-41. See generally Rossi, supra note 30; Esman, Limi-
tations on Dose Estimation, 42 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 3 (1981); Altshuler, Modeling of
Dose-Response Relationships, 42 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 23 (1981). A dose-response curve is
a graphical representation of responses to different doses of a substance plotted as a line.
When information about effects in unknown (e.g. at minute dosages) the line is plotted by
extrapolating from known dose-response relationships. Extrapolations can be done by several
methods, including methods based on "theoretical arguments as to biological and physical
mechanisms operating." REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 34, at 35. The effect of
extrapolation technique on the question of causation is that, given a group exposed at low
dosage, the association of responses with the substance may be even more uncertain. A toxic
tort plaintiff should be able to show some dose-response relationship based on some method or
theory. See infra notes 110-111 and accompanying text.
The question of causation is also complicated by the fact that subjects of epidemiologic
study rarely are exposed to only one toxic substance. See, e.g., Waxweiler, Epidemiologic
Problems Associated with Exposure to Several Agents, 42 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 51, 51-52
(1982) (uranium miners exposed to radon daughters, cobalt, bismuth, arsenic, radium, ura-
nium). If the disease under study has several possible causes, exposure to these several causes
can actually reduce the epidemiologist's ability to detect any one cause. Weiss & Liff, Ac-
counting for the Multicausal Nature of Disease in the Design and Analysis of Epidemiologic
Studies, 117 AM. J. EPID. 14, 14-15 (1983). The problem is not insurmountable. Multiple
exposures can be documented. Waxweiler, supra at 53-54 (railroad's records used to determine
herbicide use over 15-year period, plant records used to determine rubber workers' exposure to
various chemicals back to 1920). In addition, strategies exist to design and analyze epidemio-
logic studies to distinguish one cause when others are present. See Weiss & Liff, supra. The
statistical analysis required when several variables are involved is more complex than the anal-
ysis discussed in this comment. See D. BARNES, STATISTIcs AS PROOF 293-378 (1983).
B. Medical Causation and Current Tort Law
In terms of medical causation, a toxic tort plaintiff may be able
to show a causal association between a defendant's conduct and in-
creased injuries to some indeterminant members of the exposed
group. Yet current legal rules of causation make it unlikely that the
individual plaintiff can recover for his particular injury.
The two common legal tests of causation are the "but for" test
and the "substantial factor" test. Under the former, plaintiff must
show that without defendant's conduct the injury would not have oc-
curred. 9 Under the latter, the plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant's conduct contributed materially and substantially to his in-
jury.50 To meet either test, the plaintiff ordinarily must plead and
prove that his injury is "more likely than not" due to the defendant's
conduct.5 1
Since etiologies of many diseases associated with low levels of
toxic substances are unknown, it would appear 5  that physicians can-
not determine by physical examination or testing whether a toxin
caused a particular disease.58 But, the alternative to the current
practice of having the examining physician testify - using epidemi-
ological evidence to prove causation - may similarly fail to satisfy
traditional "cause-in-fact" rules. Many diseases associated with toxic
substances have natural rates of occurrence in the absence of the
toxin, indicating that the toxin cannot be the only cause." In such
cases, the "but for" test is not met because the plaintiff's injury
49. PROSSER, supra note 36, at 238-39.
50. Id. at 240.
51. Id. at 241.
52. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow an expert witness to testify to an opinion or
inference based on data obtained by him before trial. The data need not be admissible "[i]f of
a type reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject." FED. R. EVID. 703. When a disease is of unknown etiology, a physician
should not opine about the cause of a specific instance of the disease because if epidemiological
evidence exists, it is not the type reasonably relied on to draw an inference of causation in an
individual case. Despite the Rule, one federal court found a doctor's testimony dispositive of
the issue of the cause of a case of Guillain-Barre Syndrome, a disease of unknown etiology.
Sulesky v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D. W.Va. 1982).
The contradiction in determining the legal fact of causation upon testimony that is medi-
cally insupportable has been recognized by at least one court:
The medical evidence in this case conforms to the well-known fact that cancer is
a disease of esoteric etiology. Although, except to the legal mind, with its pecu-
liar thought processes, it may seem anomalous to say that only experts may tes-
tify as to facts or matters concerning which they profess ignorance, it seems to
be settled in Texas that the question of causal connection . . . is "a question of
science determinable only from the testimony of expert medical professionals."
[Citations omitted).
Employer's Mut. Liab. Co. v. Parker, 418 S.W.2d 570, 571-72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
53. 129 CONG. REc. §3922 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983) (Summary of "Radiogenic Can-
cer Compensation Act" entered into record at request of Sen. Hatch).
54. See supra note 40.
might have occurred even if he had not been exposed to the toxin. 5
The substantial factor test also is unsatisfied because the toxin and
the natural causes probably operate separately to cause distinct in-
stances of the disease."
Direct proof of causation is not possible. Circumstantial proof is
also unavailing because no victim can make itappear more probable
than not that his or her injury stemmed from defendant's conduct.
57
In the previous hypothetical, for example, plaintiff can show only a
five out of fifteen or thirty-three percent probability that his individ-
ual injury was caused by the toxic spill. This proof does not satisfy
the "more-likely-than-not" standard. s Actually, in cases to date,
courts have held that plaintiffs fail to prove causation if the
probability of causation they prove falls below fifty percent.69
Even when the probability conforms to the traditional burden of
proof, judicial attitudes toward statistical evidence may defeat plain-
tiff's claim.60 As one commentator observed, "Traditionally, statisti-
cal evidence was inadmissible as .. .hearsay. With the advent of
modern technology, however, certain classes of statistical material
became admissible but always as explicitly stated exception to the
hearsay rule."'" Even where epidemiological evidence has been ad-
mitted, "judges [have] not treat[ed] the evidence with much more
respect than if they had merely excluded it on the ground of hear-
say." 62 At least one federal district court has ruled that "statistical
evidence [alone] cannot establish cause and effect." 3
55. See, e.g., Employer's Mut. Liab., 418 S.W.2d at 574; Braden, 177 So. 2d at 236.
56. For example, if 10 cancers occur naturally and 15 cancers occur after exposure to a
toxin (in populations of 100), none of the 15 cancers is necessarily caused by a combination of
natural causes and the toxin. (At least, this is true in the absence of synergy. See REVIEW OF
RIsK ASSESSMENT, supra note 34, at 22.) Thus, natural causes result in 10 of the 15 cancers,
although they cannot be singled out. These separate, but identical, injuries from distinct causes
present a different situation from that of two factors combining to cause a single injury. E.g.,
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
57. Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminant
Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 887 (1982) (referring to a "statistical paradigm" of causa-
tion similar to the problem of toxic tort causation).
58. See supra note 13.
59. E.g., Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
60. Where the objective statistical probability is greater than 51%, the trier of fact may
subjectively believe the probability is lower. See infra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
Perhaps courts have (at least unconsciously) recognized this subjective nature of the problem.
61. Harley, Proof of Causation in Environmental Litigation, in Toxic TORTS 403
(1977) (emphasis in the original).
62. Id. at 410.
63. Robinson v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 320, 330 (E.D. Mich. 1982). But cf. Gates
v. United States, 707 F.2d 1141, 1146-47 (10th Cir. 1983) (court did not reach the issue of
whether expert testimony based solely on statistical evidence is insufficient to rebut a prima
facie case of causation, since experts based their report in part on physical examinations of
plaintiff).
III. Inadequacies of Current Proposals
A number of solutions have been proposed to allow toxic tort
plaintiffs at least some measure of recovery and to see that culpable
defendants pay for the actual amount of harm they cause. This sec-
tion explores some of the more persuasive proposals to date and
highlights their limitations.
A. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Several writers recommend shifting the burden of proof on the
issue of causation to the defendant upon some threshhold showing by
the plaintiff.64 Model legislation has been proposed that would shift
the burden to the defendant to rebut several presumptions amount-
ing to cause-in-fact, provided the plaintiff first proves that the toxin
(1) traveled a particular "pathway" from defendant to plaintiff and
(2) "resulted in the etiology of the injury or disease claimed ... "65
The requirement that plaintiff prove etiology66 is justified by
reasoning that "[w]ithout clearly linking the actual toxicant to the
specific etiology in the victim, a statistical correlation should not be
regarded as tantamount to a causation showing." 7 However, many
diseases linked statistically to toxic substances are of unknown or
uncertain etiology,68 and requiring a showing of etiology may erect
an insurmountable barrier, leaving many plaintiffs as they are now
- remediless.
Another writer avoids this outcome by requiring plaintiffs to
make out a "prima facie case," not by showing etiology, but by
showing, among other things, that the injury is "causally indetermi-
nate" and that the "variables [are] uniform enough to permit calcu-
lation of the increased number of victims.""' The burden would shift
to the defendant to prove noncausation as to individual injuries.
This proposal demonstrates the primary defect in merely shift-
64. E.g., Delgado, supra note 57, at 899-902; Note, Radiation Injury and the Atomic
Veteran: Shifting the Burden of Proof on Factual Causation, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 963-74
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Radiation Injury); Toxic Substance Pollution, supra note 9, at
747-48. Plaintiff also made this argument (unsuccessfully) in Lima v. United States, 708 F.2d
502, 508 (10th Cir. 1983).
65. Toxic Substance Pollution, supra note 10, at 745.
66. The writer of the model legislation defines etiology as "all of the causes of a disease
and the study of those causes." Id. at 686 n.2.
67. Id. at 741. By asserting that statistics, without etiology should not be dispositive of
causation, perhaps the writer of the model act meant only that correlation, without some bio-
logically credible explanation for the correlation, should not amount to a showing of causation.
If so, the requirement of etiology corresponds to the criteria of biological credibility that epide-
miologists require before drawing causal inferences. See infra notes 110-111 and accompany-
ing text.
68. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
69. Delgado, supra note 57, at 899-900. This comment also proposes that plaintiff be
required to prove that his injury is "causally indeterminate" except by statistical probability.
See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
ing the burden of proof - that it fails to recognize the statistical evi-
dence situation is not one in which evidence is concealed from plain-
tiff and available to defendant. Both parties may have access to the
statistics, and shifting the burden of persuasion to defendant effec-
tively accomplished nothing, since those statistics are known to sup-
port his case. Again utilizing the above hypothetical, if plaintiff
proves an increase of five liver cancers, resulting in a thirty-three
percent chance that his liver cancer was caused by defendant, the
burden would shift. But in that case, defendant can easily prove a 67
percent chance that he did not cause plaintiff's injury. He can meet
the shifted burden by pointing to plaintiff's own evidence and win a
directed verdict. Even if that objection is somehow overcome, shift-
ing the burden of proof might also result in overcharging defendant
for those injuries which he did not cause.7
B. Lowering Plaintif's Burden of Proof
The proposal to simply lower plaintiff's burden of proof of cau-
sation is also open to criticism that it would overcharge defendants.
In the most fully developed proposal published to date, the proponent
employs a risk-benefit analysis to create a "sliding scale" burden of
proof of causation.71 Under this analysis, the court first determines
whether the scientific uncertainty in the case is "unresolvable and
touches on essential areas of plaintiff's case."'7 2 Then the court bal-
ances the seriousness of plaintiff's injury against benefits to the com-
munity from defendant's conduct to determine whether, in light of
the balance struck, the evidence of probability is admissible despite
its uncertainty.73
This risk-benefit approach, however, is irrelevant to the issue of
causation.74 While attempting to inject policy considerations into the
determination of cause-in-fact, the risk-benefit analysis skirts the pri-
mary policy concern involved - that victims who cannot prove cau-
sation except by evidence of probability should have some remedy
70. When the probability of causation for any single injury is 33%, it is 67% probable
that the defendant did not cause the injury. If the burden shifts to the defendant and if he
cannot use the statistics alone to disprove causation, he will be charged for the full amount of
injury in cases in which it is likely he caused no injury. If defendant has caused an increase of
5 cancers over a natural rate of ten, he would pay for all 15. Proportioning recovery based
upon probability of causation avoids the overcharge. See Delgado, supra note 57, at 901; infra
note 75 and accompanying text.
71. Toxic Substance Contamination: The Risk-Benefit Approach to Causation Analy-
sis, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 53, 62-67 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Risk-Benefit Approach].
72. Id. at 63. This criterion is essentially the same as requiring that the plaintiff have
no other evidence of causation available. Cf. infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 63-64.
74. The utility or nonutility of defendant's activity has no logical connection with de-
fendant's liability for plaintiff's injury for "[tihe Anglo-American system does not award dam-
ages simply because a defendant has done something reprehensible, created a risk, or behaved
irresponsibly." Delgado, supra note 57, at 903 (footnote omitted).
against a defendant who has indisputably caused an increased num-
ber of injuries.
C. Proportional Recovery
One solution that does not overcharge defendants would propor-
tion plaintiff's recovery based on the total increase in injuries among
the group exposed to defendant's toxin. The defendant would thus
pay only for the number of injuries causally associated with his con-
duct. Furthermore, all potential plaintiffs, those exposed and injured,
would be eligible for a pro-rata share of the total. 5 The most glaring
problem with this scheme is that it undercompensates plaintiffs who,
though medically undeterminable, were actually injured by the de-
fendant. It also provides a windfall to those whose injuries resulted
from natural causes. 
7
1. Requiring All Potential Plaintiffs to Sue as Class. - Two
proposed methods of administering proportional recovery deserve
separate consideration. First is the plan to require all potential plain-
tiffs to sue the defendant as a class. Various proposals would require
single plaintiffs who wish to sue defendant to prosecute a representa-
tive suit and then share the total recovery with members of the class
either pro-rata7 or on an average basis.78 The obvious advantage of
this plan is that it eliminates the need to prove causation of the indi-
vidual injury. The'representative plaintiff need only show that defen-
dant caused the higher incidence of the injury. Individual recoveries
then would be just a matter of allocating the damage award.
On the other hand, certain practical difficulties negative the
purposed advantages of this proposal. The biggest problem would be
to determine class membership, particularly when the disease that is
the subject of suit has a long latency period. An individual may con-
tract a disease ten or twenty years79 before the rest of his "class".
75. If 15 persons develop liver cancers and defendant is causally linked to only five of
those cancers, defendant would pay only enough to compensate five plaintiffs, but all 15 cancer
victims would receive a pro-rata share of the total.
76. In "probability of causation" cases in which plaintiffs can produce no evidence ex-
cept a statistical probability, undercompensation and windfall are not necessarily fatal flaws.
See infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
77. Delgado, supra note 57, at 899-902.
78. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 917-18 (1984). Rosenberg does not condi-
tion recovery upon proof of the probability of causation as that term is used here. Under his
approach the defendant would merely fund a class recovery for the higher incidence of disease
caused. The court would distribute the fund among those injured on the basis of an averaged
damages. Thus, there would be no real need to prove probability of causation, just the in-
creased incidence of the disease.
79. One author reports that "[i]n the case of asbestos, the latency period for mesothe-
lioma was about 15 years with most cases developing after 25 years and hepatic angiosarcoma
from vinyl chloride had a latency period of over 20 years." Levy, supra note 11, at 521 n.3.
This interval may be even longer in cases of prolonged toxic expo-
sure, especially when some members' initial exposure occurs long af-
ter others have been exposed. Therefore, the true class of injured
persons may not exist when the first plaintiff brings suit.
Moreover, future victims might be unfairly bound by the out-
come of the first plaintiff's action. 0 Even if the court established
funds to assure future recovery, 81 problems of notice and inadequate
representation might arise. If there are as yet no other known in-
jured persons, the plaintiff will not know whom to notify of the class
suit.8 Furthermore, requiring the plaintiff to notify all exposed per-
sons, who are, after all, only potential members of the injured class,
might become prohibitively expensive. Foreseeably, the young and
healthy might ignore their notice, when risk of disease is merely a
chance or far-off possibility." Certainly, the court cannot assure that
the first plaintiff is representative of a class 84 the majority of which
may not appear for decades. Indeed, considering potential genera-
tional intervals between the onset of disease, the first plaintiff's inju-
ries and other aspects of his case may be entirely different than those
of future victims.
Proportional recovery also fails to account for changes in tech-
nology. Advances in medical knowledge and scientific technique may
shift the known probability of causation or perhaps replace
probability with certainty. Such long periods are ideal for the pro-
duction of new epidemiologic evidence, dependent as the science is
on long-term studies. Even if courts could create some mechanism to
adjust for future shifts in probability,85 only plaintiffs would have the
incentive to assert a change in probability. Therefore, serial litigation
by individual plaintiffs to establish probability would not be elimi-
nated, nor would plaintiffs be relieved of the cost of finding or devel-
oping evidence of the probability of causation and the entire reason
for the proportional recovery scheme would have failed."
80. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 913.
81. Id. at 919-21.
82. Under the Federal Rules, class actions may be brought on behalf of persons who
will have a certain status in the future, but such prospective remedies are limited to actions for
injunctive relief. Because a FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) action requires this notice in the category
of class actions is unavailable to prospective classes. Yaffee v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1366
(1st Cir. 1972).
83. Cf. Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (noting
that in toxic torts some persons might neglect to 'opt out' of class actions only to discover years
later that they have developed the disease they now wish to litigate individually.
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
85. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 921 n.270.
86. Indeed, Professor Rosenberg notes that "plaintiff attorneys would monitor changes
in the estimates of excess risks." Id. at 924. Ironically, such changes are unlikely to occur
except by the efforts of plaintiffs themselves. The knowledge-generating effect is one of the
benefits of the proposal made in this comment. By maintaining adversarial litigation between
defendants and individual plaintiffs, at least some of the costs would fall upon defendants. See
Finally, although toxic torts may result in cases with a common
causation issue, other, individual issues, such as assumption of risk,
may predominate.87 Furthermore, class suits simply may not be as
psychologically satisfying to victims. Certainly, persons with deadly
or disfiguring diseases, are not likely to view their own cases in terms
of statistical formulae. As the recent controversy over the "agent or-
ange" settlement suggests, victims may also resent defendants being
"let off the hook" after one suit, while plaintiffs are left to fight
among themselves for the limited funds available.88
2. Proof of Probability of Causation. - The second method
of proportioning damages simply allows individual plaintiffs to re-
cover by proving only a probability of causation and bases recovery
on the probability proved. For example, if the plaintiff proved a
thirty-three percent probability that defendant caused his injury, he
would recover only thirty-three percent of his total damages. A vari-
ation on this scheme has been incorporated into a bill introduced in
the United States Senate to compensate victims of nuclear testing in
Nevada during the 1950s and 1960s. 9 The "Radiogenic Cancer
Compensation Act" would require a federal agency to establish
radioepidemiologic tables of "probabilities that various cancers have
been caused by various doses of ionizing radiation." 90 Plaintiffs cov-
ered by this act would need only to prove dosage of their exposure,
and the tables would then serve as irrebuttable presumptions of the
probability of causation. Damages would be proportioned to the
probability.
However, the proposed Act proportions damages only in cases in
which the probability is less than 51 percent. Plaintiffs proving de-
fendant "more likely than not" caused their injury would receive full
damages up to a $500,000 ceiling. 91 Since all plaintiffs under the Act
would sue a single defendant, the United States, the Act results in
overcharging that defendant.9 Unique reasons justify overcharge in
infra note 97.
87. See Levy, supra note 11, at 584-85.
88. Cf. Fewer Veterans May Be Eligible In Dioxin Award, Wall St. J., May 25, 1984,
at 4, col. 2 (veterans called settlement of "Agent Orange" case a sellout, because only an
estimated 2500 victims could recover, while approximately 50,000 veterans and family mem-
bers had suffered injuries); Agent Orange Pact Sparks Differences In Veterans Groups, Wall
St. J., May 9, 1984, at 2, col. 4 (veterans feared inadequacy of settlement would shift the
dispute to fights among themselves for access to the fund).
89. S. 921, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. §3924
(daily ed. Mar. 24, 1983).
90. 129 CONG. REC. §3920, supra note 89.
91. Id. §§3920-21.
92. The probability of causation approach results in no overcharge only because errors
are equalized over the long run. See Kaye, Limits on the Preponderance of the Evidence Stan-
dard, 1982 A.B.A. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 487, 496-503 [hereinafter cited as Preponderance of
the Evidence]. If the approach applies only to those plaintiffs whose probability is less than
this particular context;" no such reasons support either an over-
charge of private defendants or a ceiling on damages in the general
toxic tort field.
D. Administrative Solutions
The requirement of the "Radiogenic Cancer Compensation
Act" that a federal agency establish tables of probability also illus-
trates what might be called "administrative solutions" to the toxic
tort cause-in-fact problem. A more far-reaching proposal would re-
quire Congress to order a federal agency to catalog all carcinogenic
substances and their toxic effects.94 State legislatures could then
adopt the federal catalog and give them the force of rebuttable
presumptions.
Such an administrative proposal, however, would shift the cost
of generating information about risks of toxic substances to the pub-
lic, relieving defendants of their present responsibility to determine
the risks of their activities.96 Defendants predictably will lobby any
agency charged with cataloging toxic substance risks. 96 Even if un-
due influence from lobbying can be minimized, in relying on public
input to develop standards and studies, agencies may become suscep-
51%, this equalizing principle may fail, especially where one defendant is subject to suit by
various plaintiffs exposed at different dosages.
Suppose a nuclear power plant leaks radiation, exposing persons to dosages inversely pro-
portional to distance from the plant. Suppose further that epidemiological studies establish
three groups of plaintiffs with probabilities of causation of 20%, 40%, and 60%. Under the
probability of causation approach, defendant power company pays each member of the 20%
group 20% of his damages and each member of the 40% group 40% of his damages. If the
approach is abandoned above 51% in favor of the preponderance of the evidence standard
because each can prove causation, defendant still pays each member of the 60% group 100% of
his damages even though the defendant did not cause 30% of those injuries. No equalizing
offset remains because defendant has paid for all the injuries for which the probability is less
than 51%, and thus would offset. See id. at 502.
93. There was evidence that the Government knew the risks of nuclear testing but
failed to warn persons who participated, failed to monitor exposure levels adequately, and
failed to protect potential victims. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 347-404 (D. Utah
1984); Note, Radiation Injury, supra note 64, at 938-57.
94. Tort Actions For Cancer, supra note 12, at 855. Unlike the "Radiogenic Cancer
Compensation Act," the carcinogenic catalog plan does not include a provision for proportion-
ing damages and requires the probability of causation to meet traditional standards. This plan
would overcharge defendants and would not aid plaintiffs whose probability is less than 51%.
See supra notes 57-59, 70 and accompanying text.
95. Current law holds manufacturers of drugs and chemicals "to the skill of an expert"
in the field and presumes them to have expert knowledge of the materials and processes of
their business. See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1277. Included in this presumption of expertise is the
duty to keep abreast of the latest scientific developments. See LaPlant v. E.. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231, 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). Placing the duty to research
and generate information about toxic substance risk on government undercuts these well-devel-
oped duties. Also, commercial defendants are likely to be parties who "will have the greater
access to the information and technology necessary to develop this knowledge," and can do so
relatively cheaply. Delgado, supra note 57, at 894.
96. Tort Actions For Cancer, supra note 12, at 855 n.69. See also Dow Chemical
Urging Got EPA to Soften 1981 Dioxin Water Report. Officials Say, Wall St. J. Mar. 16,
1983, at 4, col. 2.
tible to an unhealthy dependence on industrial experts and research.
Finally, cataloging probabilities of causation may freeze re-
search at the level of knowledge existing when it was cataloged.
Neither plaintiffs nor defendants would be likely to pay for indepen-
dent research since the results probably would not prevail over cata-
loged research. As a result, private sector sources of information
about toxic substance risk might tend to dry up'7 under the adminis-
trative scheme of causation.
IV. Toxic Tort Recovery - A Simplified Approach
In addition to difficulties already enumerated, all of the previous
suggested proposals suffer a common flaw. They are all too sophisti-
cated for the problem they attempt to solve. Either they require
complex and uncertain risk-benefit analysis by the courts; they in-
volve intricacies of class actions; or they necessitate government bu-
reaucracies that may actually impede information-generating duties
of defendants. Scientific issues in toxic tort litigation are complex.
Requiring courts to spend time on collateral issues, such as risk-ben-
efit analysis or class certification, that have nothing to do with causa-
tion, wastes the court's valuable time. The solution to the problem of
toxic tort causation should focus the court's attention on the issue of
causation and on what may be the only evidence available to prove
it. This section proposes such a solution.
A. Proposed Solution
Courts should require less than the traditional quantum of proof
from the plaintiff in toxic tort cases. Provided the plaintiff proves the
unavailability of other medical evidence, the court should permit the
case to go to trial with statistical evidence limited to the issue of
causation 8 and the issue of causation limited to the probability al-
leged in the complaint."' Upon sufficient evidence, the plaintiff
should be awarded a recovery proportioned to the probability of cau-
sation he has shown.
97. Conversely, under the "probability of causation" scheme of recovery proposed in
this comment, the plaintiff would be able to meet causation requirements with epidemiological
evidence produced by government agencies, private research foundations, toxic chemical man-
ufacturers, hospitals, universities, and other sources - creating a new market for such re-
search. To rebut such evidence, defendants will have an incentive to conduct or finance their
own research.
98. Statistical evidence alone should not be allowed to prove negligence, for example.
See Fischer, Tort Law: Expanding the Scope of Recovery Without Loss of Jury Control, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 992 (1983). Nor should statistics be permitted to prove the identity of
the defendant except as allowed under traditional rules. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1365-66.
99. The process of holding an evidentiary hearing after commencement of the action to
determine whether it may proceed as a "probability of causation" case is analogous to the
process of certification of class actions. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
1. Pleading the Probability. - As a preliminary requirement,
before the court permits less than the traditional proof, the plaintiff
should first prove, by traditional preponderance of the evidence stan-
dards, that no evidence is available'00 on the issue of causation other
than epidemiological evidence; in other words, that no known biolog-
ical mechanism of causation exists' 0 ' and that causation cannot be
determined to a reasonable medical certainty. 02 For, as a matter of
policy, "to create an incentive for plaintiffs to do more than establish
the background statistics," the proof required should not be lessened
when other evidence is available.'03
In addition to pleading and proving the unavailability of non-
statistical evidence, the plaintiff should be required to establish the
proof which is available to him. For example, if his evidence shows a
five out of fifteen or thirty-three percent probability that defendant
caused his injury, this probability should be alleged in plaintiff's
complaint and proven during the trial.
The plaintiff should not be allowed to plead percentages of
probability in the alternative (e.g., that the probability is thirty-three
percent or twenty-five percent). This pleading prohibition anticipates
the concern that statistical evidence is as confusing to the layman as
it is convincing to juries.'0 4 Pleading one probability focuses the
jury's attention on the simplest possible issue. The restriction also
requires the plaintiff to make hard evaluations about his evidence at
the pleading stage, reducing the risk that less-than-reliable evidence
will be presented to the jury.'05 Finally, requiring plaintiff to plead
100. "Unavailability" may mean that information is either theoretically or practically
unobtainable. If the information is theoretically unobtainable, plaintiff cannot produce it and
meets the required showing. If the information is practically beyond plaintiffs grasp, because it
can only be obtained after years of research involving millions of dollars, then the court must
determine who should bear the cost of producing the information on causation. Cf. Gelpe &
Tarlock, The Users of Scientific Information in Environmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 371, 392-96 (1974) (categorizing ecological information used to make administrative
decisions about environmental matters). Defendant should in most cases bear that cost. See
supra note 96.
Care should be exercised when determining the unavailability of evidence to distinguish
evidence of causation from evidence regarding other issues. Evidence of symptoms, for exam-
ple, will exist in any toxic tort. Generally, symptoms tend only to show that plaintiff has a
particular disease and, if etiology is unknown, do not support a finding of causation.
101. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
102. A reasonable medical certainty that a toxin causes a disease exists if the statistical
association is strong enough to permit the conclusion that the disease never occurs but for the
toxin. See supra note 46. See Tribe, supra note 98, at 1349. See also infra notes 127-132 and
accompanying text.
103. Tribe, supra note 98, at 1349; Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence (Book Review),
89 YALE L.J. 601, 610 (1980). The court should decide in an evidentiary hearing prior to the
start of plaintiff's case whether statistical evidence of probability will suffice.
104. See, e.g., Dickson, supra note 36, at 796, 800; Statistics and the Law, supra note
37, at 333-35.
105. Such evidence not only takes up more court time, but also may serve to confuse
jurors, forcing them to make crude guesses among percentages, thereby distorting the propor-
tional damage award. Cf. Fischer, supra note 98, at 989 (plaintiff's and defendant's experts
one probability with particularity notifies defense counsel of the ex-
act scientific issues involved. If issues and evidence are already
overly complex, this notice helps to insure that defense counsel has
adequate time to prepare.106
Plaintiff should be permitted to amend his complaint to conform
to proof of a different probability at trial. Amendment will permit
plaintiff to benefit from the knowledge-generating effects over time
while the singular focus of the jury will not be distracted by alterna-
tive pleading.
2. Causation and Probability of Causation. - At trial, plain-
tiff would have two required showings: (1) that the defendant's con-
duct caused the increased occurrence of injury within plaintiffs
group, and (2) that the probability that defendant's conduct also
caused plaintiffs individual injury is the probability alleged in plain-
tiff's complaint.
The first showing corresponds to the epidemiologic method of
establishing a causal association between a suspected cause and an
increased incidence of disease.11 7 Initially, plaintiff would have to
prove an exposure to defendant's toxic substance and a higher inci-
dence of disease among those persons exposed. In addition, plaintiff
would have to prove that this excess incidence is statistically signifi-
cant 08 and that the methodology used to establish the association is
may be so far apart that jury has no basis, except crude approximation, to decide between the
extremes). Under the present proposal, experts may still differ. Since plaintiff need not prove
over 50% probability and since both side's experts will be subject to the same statistical and
epidemiological standards, however, they should not be "miles apart." Moreover, the closeness
of the figures may encourage settlement.
106. Cf. Dickson, supra note 36, at 807 (notice of party's intention to use an expert
epidemiologist as witness should be adequate to give opposing counsel time to prepare
properly).
107. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
108. The significance of the statistical comparison, at first, would appear to be a matter
of admissibility under the rule that data upon which an expert opinion is based must be of the
type reasonably relied on by others in this field. See FED. R. EvID. 703. Thus, the level of
significance required would be determined by the court as a matter of admissibility.
The United States Supreme Court discussed the correct method of hypothesis testing to
determine discriminatory jury selection in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17
(1977). Most recently, this same standard was applied to the statistical evidence of causation
in a toxic tort case, and the court required the evidence to meet a 95% confidence level. Koller
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 80-1258 (D.D.C. May 19, 1980) (evidentiary hearing held
Dec. 3, 1980) (drug benedectin alleged to have caused birth defects). Plaintiff's counsel have
hotly disagreed with the court's requirement, arguing, among other things: (1) that the same
rationale does not apply to discrimination cases; (2) that existing statistical methodology (e.g.,
confidence intervals) permit lesser levels of confidence,and (3) that confidence level should be a
matter of the weight of expert epidemiological testimony and not its admissibility. Telephone
interview with W. David Allen, Esq., Allen T. Eaton & Associates, Washington, D.C. (Oct.
18, 1983).
In accord with counsel's objections above, the United States District Court for the District
of Utah has recently noted that high levels of statistical significance (e.g. 94.73%) though
perhaps deemed insignificant by the researcher seeking a higher level of certainty, nevertheless
show a far more likely than not relationship between hypothetical cause and observed effect.
scientifically sound. 109
Beyond the statistical association, plaintiff should be required to
produce evidence from which the jury can draw an inference of cau-
sation, since the statistically higher incidence alone does not support
such an inferece. 1 At the very least, the court should require some
evidence of the minimal criteria for drawing a causal inference,
namely: (1) strength of association, (2) credible time sequence, or
(3) biological credibility."' More comprehensive criteria for building
causal inferences exist, and courts may wish to adopt these more
stringent standards to determine the sufficiency of evidence from
which juries can draw such inferences.
Although litigants are likely to present expert epidemiologists as
witnesses to testify on the issue of causation, more should be re-
quired than an expert's assessment that a statistical association is
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. at 417.
Perhaps an accurate method of reporting would be to indicate at what level of
certainty the statistical relationship is significant. [citation omitted.] This would
permit more immediate evaluation of the degree of certainty or randomness. The
cold statement that a given relationship is not "statistically significant" cannot
be read to mean "there is no probability of a relationship." Whether a correla-
tion between a cause and a group of effects is more likely than not - particu-
larly in a legal sense - is a different question form that answered by tests of
statistical significance.
Id. at 349.
As another writer has suggested:
[a] lawyer might find it easier to distinguish between [statistical significance and
practical significance] by identifying statistical significance with the credibility
of the evidence and practical significance with the relevance and materiality of
the evidence.
D. BARNES, supra note 37, at 144.
109. Closely allied to the question of statistical significance is the question whether the
evidence resulted from valid methodology. Methodology also goes to the admissibility of the
evidence. The United States Supreme Court held that a lower court correctly rejected statisti-
cal evidence based on an incorrect comparison. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299, 301-05 (1977). See also Henkel v. R.& S. Bottling Co., 323 N.W.2d 185, 192-93
(Iowa 1982) (U.S. Bureau of Epidemiology report held inadmissible because methodologic
error made report untrustworthy, therefore report was not exception to hearsay rule). See gen-
erally Statistics and the Law, supra note 37, at 316-22.
Epidemiological studies should approximate the "gold standard" of experimental research
as closely as possible. Feinstein & Horwitz, supra note 31, at 1617. To achieve this approxi-
mation, principles of experimentation should be adhered to. Id. These principles include: (I)
quality control in collection and verification of basic data; (2) fairness of comparison, including
safeguards against bias; and (3) cogency of methods, maintained by actively seeking and cor-
recting methodologic errors and by adhering to the principles that hypotheses cannot be tested
with the same data originally used to generate the hypotheses. Id. at 1613-16.
110. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
Ill. Id. An expert epidemiological witness utilized a similar three-prong test in a toxic
tort case, and the court adopted the test in analyzing his testimony and that of other expert
witnesses. Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306, 311-15 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (swine flu vac-
cine litigation). In determining the weight to be given an epidemiological study, another court
relied on the fact that it made "more biological sense" than testimony of an opposing expert.
O'Gara v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 786, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1983). E.g., Ryan, supra note 44
(suggesting a process that would use five criteria similar to criteria proposed here and "succes-
sive, increasingly more rigidly controlled studies" to refute alternative inferences); Evans,
supra note 44 (setting forth a history of criteria used to establish cause of disease in the
medical field and propounding a "unified concept" with ten criteria).
causal, for "the distinction between an association and a causal fac-
tor is subjective, not mathematical" and therefore is only a matter of
opinion.
112
The reason for requiring other evidence substantiating the sta-
tistical association is best explained by the subjective theory of
probability. The subject theory of probability is a method for trans-
lating objective frequencies into subjective beliefs of the trier of
fact." It has been explained as the quantification of the strength of
a rational person's belief "in terms of the odds a person would accept
on a bet as to the truth of a proposition."' 4 In the absence of other
information, the objective frequency equals the subjective odds.
Conversely, the absence of available evidence other than mere fre-
quency, might persuade the rational person that the missing evidence
would not support the belief; therefore, the objective frequency
would overstate the probability. 1 6 As a result, additional evidence
together with statistical evidence may meet required standards of
proof while statistics alone would not.1
7
The present proposal requires the plaintiff to prove the correla-
tive: that no evidence exists other than statistical evidence to prove
the cause of his individual injury. Proving that the statistical associa-
tion is not distorted by any other known causal factors should per-
suade the fact finder that the association is the closest approximation
of probability attainable." 8 Once the plaintiff has proven this
112. Dickson, supra note 36, at 802. Experts do not always base their testimony on
accepted scientific data. See supra note 52. See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 31 (E. Cleary ed. 1972). Generally, an expert's opinion must be based upon facts on
the record. The sufficiency of the factual basis is typically left to an expert who is in the best
position to determine it, unless the court can take notice of insufficiency. See id. at 35-36. In
the circumstances under discussion, the court should take notice of insufficient basis unless the
opinion is based on the same epidemiologically accepted foundation as required above for jury-
drawn inferences. Cf. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495-96, 500 (sufficiency of evidence determined
by all the facts that bear on the issue, including statistical disparities). See also Statistics and
the Law, supra note 37, at 321 & n.74 (federal circuit courts seem to require that statistical
evidence be examined in context with other evidence).
113. Tribe, supra note 98, at 1346.
114. Gatecrasher, supra note 15, at 105.
115. Tribe, supra note 98, at 1346-48. Cf. Gatecrasher, supra note 15, at 109 n.27.
116. Kaye, Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to
Dr. Cohen's Reply, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 637 [hereinafter cited as Paradoxes].
117. Tribe, supra note 98, at 1350. This subjective theory of probability, particularly its
use to justify requiring further evidence to bolster the juror's belief in an objective probability,
has been criticized. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 869-74.
First, Rosenberg notes that requiring "particularistic" evidence in mass exposure cases is
misguided since such evidence is unavailable. Id. at 869. Secondly, the system should be satis-
fied with the jury's belief in the probability of causation. Id. at 873. Neither declaration is
incompatible with the subjective theory. It is not so much that the presentation of nonstatisti-
cal evidence is required to create certainty but that the absence of such evidence creates uncer-
tainty. A good explanation for the absence of evidence can also serve to overcome doubts. See
supra note 116. The elimination of doubt about the probability is especially important in pro-
portional recovery cases, since the probability will determine the damages defendant owes. See
generally Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 866-68, 881-87.
118. Professor Tribe believes "if plaintiff can satisfactorily account for the evidentiary
probability, he may recover that proportion of his total damages.
Allowing plaintiff to recover upon proof of the probability is not
the same as shifting the burden of proof to defendant or lowering
plaintiff's burden on the issue of cause-in-fact. Traditional cause-in-
fact operates as an "all or nothing" concept." 9 The trier of fact de-
termines that the defendant either did or did not cause the plaintiff's
injury. Under the probability of causation approach, on the other
hand, the plaintiff does not prove causation but only a mathematical
likelihood of causation. For this reason, the defendant may not de-
feat plaintiff's claim by showing he was not "more likely than not"
the cause. Instead, he must show either that no evidence exists link-
ing him to plaintiff's injury or that the probability alleged by plain-
tiff lacks scientific foundation.
Another consequence of this approach is that every plaintiff, not
just those who prove probability less than 51 percent, must be lim-
ited to proportional recovery. Probability, expressed as a percentage,
is the fact to be proved, the ultimate issue. Probability does not serve
in this context as evidence of causation, which is not in issue at all.
To illustrate, a plaintiff who shows a statistical probability of 75 per-
cent, has proven his objective probability but has not necessarily
proven causation. In subjective terms, the jury's belief, based on the
statistic alone, might fall far short of the objective measure.
Under traditional tort standards, if the jury's subjective belief
rises above 51 percent, cause-in-fact has been proved. While a sim-
ple statistic of high probability may not convince the jury, the high
probability combined with other evidence, may achieve the necessary
subjective belief to prove cause-in-fact. Traditionally, other evidence
has been required to support a finding of causation in cases in which
plaintiffs have attempted to use statistical evidence. Thus, in Un-
thank v. United States,' the plaintiff produced evidence showing a
biologically credible autoimmune mechanism for her disease, and a
close temporal relationship between the development of her disease
and exposure to the alleged cause. She also ruled out other etiologi-
cal explanations. 21 The court found that a statistical link between
the suspected cause (swine flu vaccine) and a disease similar to
plaintiff's disease, in conjunction with this evidence proved the vac-
cine caused plaintiff's particular injury. 12 On the basis of this deci-
sion, plaintiffs who can show high probabilities of causation and any
omission, the statistical evidence alone might well suffice.. . . What constitutes a satisfactory
explanation of the failure to adduce non-statistical evidence might itself turn, at least in part,
on the level of probability suggested by the statistics." Tribe, supra note 98, at 1349 n.65.
119. Cf. King, supra note 41, at 1357.
120. 533 F. Supp. 703 (D. Utah 1982).
121. Id. at 713-14.
122. Id.
other evidence of causation of the particular injury are likely to take
their chances with the traditional tort system to recover full
damages.
By hypothesis, the plaintiff must prove the unavailability of
other evidence to utilize the probability of causation approach. 2 3 As
already noted; the unavailability of evidence may also prove to a ju-
ror that the initial probability is subjectively correct.1"4 Thus, the
plaintiff who shows a 75 percent probability and proves that no other
evidence is obtainable might appear to have proved causation, even
under the "probability of causation" approach. Yet, probability is
still merely the product of a mathematical equation, and not tradi-
tionally sufficient to prove causation as a matter of law. Even if very
high, the lone fact of probability should not be accepted as proof of
causation, but only as of the likelihood of causation.
125
3. Advantages of the Probability of Causation Approach. -
The probability of causation approach can be analogized to the loss
of a chance. 26 Loss-of-chance cases can be explained by separating
the issue of the lost chance, or the value of the chance to avoid in-
jury, from the issue of causation.' 27 Under the probability of causa-
tion approach, the showing of probability amounts to a valuation of
plaintiff's proportional share of damages for the total injuries caused,
or his value lost. Probability of causation and loss of chance are not
identical, however, 2 8 for while recovery for less than a fifty percent
chance may be justified mathematically, 129 recovery for less than a
fifty percent probability of causation may not be.130
123. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. An indirect way of saying that naked statistical evidence, even when the plaintiff
justifies the nakedness, is insufficient to prove causation might be to rule plaintiff's explanation
for his failure to adduce nonstatistical evidence unsatisfactory to support a finding of absolute
causation. Cf. supra note 118. See King, supra note 41, at 1365-70. See also supra note 39.
126. King, supra note 41, at 1353-55.
127. Id. at 1394-95. See also Delgado, supra note 57, at 889. See generally supra note
41.
For one thing, loss of chance, or increased risk, applies to all persons exposed to the
dangerous substance. On the other hand, the probability of causation applies only to those who
are injured. Since only the injured are compensated, it is not true that any "windfalls" paid to
plaintiffs whose injuries were not actually caused by defendant are equivalent to damages due
for the group members' loss of chance to avoid injury. Contra Rosenberg, supra note 78, at
885-87.
128. See King, supra note 41, at 1376-77.
129. Preponderance of the Evidence, supra note 92, at 502 n.2. Professor Kaye rests his
thesis that recovery based on probability of causation is mathematically unjustified on assump-
tions that overpayments to plaintiffs are just as undesirable as underpayments and that mini-
mizing error in deciding recovery is better than spreading decisional errors equally among all
parties. Id., at 496-97. These assumptions are not necessarily correct, however, in light of
policy considerations in "probability of causation" situations. See infra notes 137-139 and ac-
companying text.
130. O'Toole, supra note 21, at 765. See also Delgado, supra note 57, at 891. While not
adopting the probability of causation approach, a federal district court recently acknowledged
Other reasons exist to support recovery for probability of causa-
tion in the narrow circumstances when no other evidence of causa-
tion is available. As one writer has concluded, cause-in-fact is not a
policy neutral concept:" 1' "Its interpretation and application must be
carried out in a manner which promotes the underlying liability pol-
icy. In short, there is a vital interplay between the idea of causation
in any given context and the basic principles of liability employed in
that context."132 While causation should serve policy ends of tort
law, current cause-in-fact rules employed in toxic tort litigation re-
sult in an abdication of that duty. 3 3 The current practice of defer-
ring to the opinion of medical experts even when etiologies are un-
known,184 may be irresponsibly permitting opinions of the medical
profession to fill the vacuum.13 5
The probability of causation approach serves the fundamental
policy of tort law - compensation of victims - by allowing all persons
possibly injured by a defendant's conduct to recover some of their
damages. Of course, plaintiffs actually injured by defendants will not
be fully compensated, while others whose injuries were not attributa-
ble will receive a windfall.13 " Although this result may seem some-
that policy considerations may favor extending liability to defendants even when statistical
evidence falls below the traditional standards. The court noted that less than 50% probability
is not wholly irrelevant to liability. The court further stated:
[Elven standing alone, the statistical evidence . . . plainly establishes . . . a
substantial factual connection. The court must determine those risks for which
the defendant should be held responsible. [citations omitted.] Whether the de-
fendant is ultimately held responsible for an injury which may likely have oc-
curred anyway is inherently a question of policy, not of factual connection or
causation.
Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. at 418.
131. O'Toole, supra note 21, at 765-66.
132. Cf. id. at 771.
133. See supra note 52.
134. Cf. O'Toole, supra note 21, at 767-71. By requiring evidence of those matters
which should be considered before drawing a causal inference, the solution proposed in this
comment places the liability decision squarely on the trier of fact. See supra notes 110-111
and accompanying text.
135. Proportional recovery mitigates the problem of the "windfall." See Delgado, supra
note 57, at 904 n.109. Besides, the defendant is not justified in retaining funds admittedly
owed for injuries he caused merely because some plaintiffs will receive a windfall and some
will not be fully compensated. Cf 3 NEWBURG, ON CLASS AcTiONS 89 (1977). Furthermore,
even the "preponderance-of-the-evidence" rule does not perfectly allocate liability and recov-
ery. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 884.
136. Trends in Products Liability Litigation, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 85 (interview with
Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Editor-in-Chief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and
Professor of Law at Suffolk Law School).
Of course, the traditional "more-likely-than-not" standard of proof serves its own policy
- the policy of minimizing errors in decision making. Preponderance of the Evidence, supra
note 92 at 496-500. Again, to illustrate, if a group of 300 workers each has a % probability of
causation of stomach cancer, under the probability of causation approach each worker with
stomach cancer recovers (2h)D, where D is total damages.
But in 2 of the 300 cases it gives (I,)D too little, and in the other % of the 300
cases, it gives (2)D too much. The total wrongly given is therefore
2( )(2)D(300)= 133.33D. The maximum likelihood [more-likely-than not] p
rule gives full recovery D in all cases. In ' of the 300 cases, it gives D too much,
what unfair, it is preferrable to the outcome necessitated by the cur-
rent rules of causation of "turn[ing] innocent victims away without
redress and exonerate[ing] admitted wrongdoers ... ", When
plaintiff cannot prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence
equalizing a greater amount of error among all persons to whom the
new approach applies may be the best alternative.
In a few instances in which policy has demanded it, the "more-
likely-than-not" standard has already given way to more equitable
rules of causation. For instance, a doctrine of "last injurious expo-
sure" has been developed which effectively replaces traditional cau-
sation requirements in cases of occupational disease caused by toxic
exposure brought under workers' compensation statutes."3 8 While
these cases are guided by discrete statute, courts have explained the
doctrine of "last injurious exposure" in terms applicable to toxic
torts. As one court noted, the reason for the doctrine lies in the
"near impossibility of determining the precise part that any given
exposure played in causing [the disease]."'
Under the aegis of similar statutory provisions federal courts
have also found a probability of causation adequate for injunctive
relief in certain cases.'40 In terms applicable to toxic torts generally,
one court explained: "Technological man has altered his world in
ways never before experienced or anticipated. The health effects of
such alternation are unknown, sometimes unknowable. . . . [T]he
statutes - and common sense - demand regulatory action to pre-
vent harm, even if the regulator is less than certain that harm is
otherwise inevitable.'
41
making the total wrongly given ( )D(300) = 100D, a distinctly small number.
To summarize, the maximum likelihood rule makes a few expensive mistakes,
but it does not err at all in most cases. The expected value [probability] rule errs
in every case - a small amount in most and a large amount in the rest, produc-
ing a larger weighted sum of errors.
id. at 502.
137. See Rosenberg, supra note 78, at 866-67 n.66 (there is "accumulating precedent
for using various forms of proportional liability").
138. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 196 Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734
(1978); McCormick v. United Nuclear Corp., 89 N.M. 740, 557 P.2d 589 (1976); Sacred
Heart Medical Center v. Department of Labor & Indus., 92 Wash. 2d 631, 600 P.2d 1015
(1979). Under the "last injurious exposure" doctrine, a worker need not prove that exposure
during his last employment caused his disease. He need show-only that the level of exposure
could cause the disease "if there were prolonged exposure." Union Carbide, 196 Colo. at 159,
581 P.2d at 736. In such circumstances, one court has held that evidence that the exposure
caused an "increased risk" is sufficient to establish liability, even if plaintiff's own expert re-
fused to testify in terms of probability that defendant caused the disease. Sacred Heart, 92
Wash. 2d at 637, 600 P.2d at 1019. The dissent vigorously objected to the majority's approach
as lowering the burden of proof from the "more-likely-than-not" standard.
139. McCormick, 89 N.M. at 745, 557 P.2d at 594. ("To decide otherwise, given the
present state of medical knowledge would involve [the court] in futile searches for unattainable
factual certainties.")
140. See, e.g., Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 520 (a "reasonable medical concern" was
sufficient to justify an injunction).
141. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Although these cases concerned injunctive relief, the principles
they drew from could have been applied just as easily to private
damage actions. It would be anomalous to assert that a defendant's
actions may be enjoined upon evidence rising only to a probability of
causation, but to allow him to escape liability for the same conduct,
should he choose to ignore the injunction. 142 This result becomes ab-
surd when, as is often the case, the defendant is harmed more by an
injunction than by proportional damages.
B. Other Considerations
The probability of causation approach does not violate the tradi-
tional tort principle that defendants be held responsible only for
those injuries which they cause. 43 Because the plaintiff must prove
by traditional standards that defendant caused some injuries, this
approach does not hold innocent defendants liable. In the aggregate,
the defendant pays only for injuries he has caused. The only differ-
ence is that he may not be paying the actual victims. Nevertheless,
traditional notions of liability, such as deterrence of future wrongful
conduct and loss spreading, will be served.' 44
Holding a defendant even partially responsible to plaintiffs
whose injuries he has not caused raises questions of constitutionality.
However, the "last injurious exposure" doctrine which is based on
the same principle as the probability of causation theory, has with-
stood constitutional challenge. Courts have held the doctrine not to
be arbitrary and capricious, or violative of due process, especially
when the employer's liability to pay damages is limited.145 The last
injurious exposure doctrine has also survived equal protection at-
tack.'46 By analogy, the probability of causation approach should
142. Risk-Benefit Approach, supra note 71, at 62.
143. Delgado, supra note 57, at 903.
144. Id. at 893-94. Termination and deterrence of unlawful conduct and forcing wrong-
doers to disgorge unlawfully held monies are also goals of the fluid recovery and cy pres meth-
ods of distributing class action damage awards. 3 NEWBURG, ON CLASS ACTIoNs 84 (1977).
These methods are similar to allowing recovery based on probability of causation. For exam-
ple, "fluid recovery and cy pres make it possible . . . to force a defendant to account for
wrongdoing that results in only a small injury to many people." Id. at 87. Fluid recovery is a
device by which a damage judgment is distributed in a way that will indirectly benefit most or
all class members. Id. at 85. Since it contemplates a class with changing membership, the
benefit of certain persons who were not originally victims is not a fatal flaw unless the differ-
ences between victims and beneficiaries are extreme. Id. Cy pres distribution requires that,
when damages cannot be paid directly to plaintiffs, they be put to their next best use. Id. at
86. The probability of causation approach also assists large classes of plaintiff's to recover, if
not necessarily for small injuries, for small probabilities of defendant's liability. The approach
indirectly benefits victims by paying them, not for their injuries, but for their probabilities,
because such payment is the next best thing to compensating particular injuries, which cannot
be determined.
145. Union Carbide, 196 Colo. at 62, 581 P.2d at 738.
146. Id. at 63, 581 P.2d at 739 (quoting Usury v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S.
1 (1976) concerning the Black Lung Act).
pass constitutional scrutiny because there is a rational connection be-
tween what is proved (causation of injury to the class, mathematical
probability of causation to the individual, and corroborating circum-
stances) and what is inferred (not causation, but only probability of
causation)."" Further, the defendant has an opportunity to rebut
plaintiff's evidence of probability and, therefore, the question of the
probability "is one for the jury upon all the evidence. ' 148
V. Conclusion
In toxic tort cases, in which plaintiff's sole evidence of causation
is statistical, the plaintiff cannot prove causation as traditionally de-
fined in tort law. Often this failure of proof is only a reflection of the
lack of knowledge in the scientific community. A probability of cau-
sation approach to the problem allows blameless victims to recovery
some compensation, but safeguards defendants by limiting their lia-
bility to the amount of injury directly attributable to them.
DWIGHT C. HARVEY
147. See Western & At. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929) ("Legislation
declaring that proof of one fact or group of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of an
ultimate fact in issue is valid if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what
is to be inferred."). Cf. 3 NEWBURG, supra note 144, at 88 (class recoveries do not necessarily
violate due process).
148. Western & Ail. R.R., 279 U.S. at 643 (quoting Mobile J. & K.C. R.R. v. Turnip-
seed, 219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910)).

